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Genetic Self Knowledge and the Future
of Epidemiologic Confounding
Tyler Vander Weele1,*
Prior work has considered how our genetic knowledge might allow for personalized medicine. This commentary explores the reverse
question of what personalized genetic medicine might do to our research process, not only in genetics, but in epidemiology more
generally.Introduction
A number of recent articles have
considered the extent to which our
genetic knowledge and research can
or eventually will allow for personal-
ized genetic medicine.1–6 Although
for many diseases our capacity to
utilize knowledge of an individual’s
genome to predict risk is still
limited,7–10 research and technolog-
ical development continue to progress
at a rapid pace.6,8 Moreover, risks tests
are already available for certain
diseases,5,11,12 and direct-to-consumer
profiling is a present reality.13
The potential of individual genomic
information for personalized medi-
cine will likely continue to be the
topic of intense discussion, and it
will be important to reflect upon the
implications for medicine of advances
made in genetic science.6 In this
commentary, however, I would like
to briefly consider the reverse ques-
tion: not what genomic research will
do for personalized medicine, but
rather, what personalized genetic
medicine may do to our research
process, not only in genetics but in
epidemiology more generally. Stated
simply, as our understanding of
genetic risk advances and as individ-
uals acquire knowledge of their own
genomes, health behaviors are likely
to change and an individual’s knowl-
edge of his or her genetic risk may
start confounding the relationship
between disease and environmental
exposures when no confounding was
previously present. This commentary
offers a few reflections on the implica-1Departments of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Ha
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confounding and ascertainment bias,
for what study designs and analytic
techniques may be appropriate in
research, and for how we might
prepare for the altered research land-
scape that may result from personal-
ized genetic medicine.
Implications of Genetic Self
Knowledge for Research
As genotyping becomes increasingly
affordable and as our understanding
of the genetic basis of disease prog-
resses, the demand for personal
genetic information will likely also
increase. If, eventually, it does become
possible to accurately assess an indi-
vidual’s genetic risk, knowledge of
such risk may change individuals’
behaviors and actions. High-risk indi-
viduals may aggressively seek to avoid
behavioral or environmental expo-
sures that increase risk yet further. It
is possible that such information
may eventually be used in construct-
ing effective prevention programs.6
When substantial gene-environment
interactions are present and known,
this may even further increase moti-
vation to avoid or eliminate certain
environmental exposures. Such alter-
ations, if they occur, could undoubt-
edly be counted as a success for
genetic preventive medicine. How-
ever, an unintended consequence of
changes in behavior that result from
genetic self knowledge would be that
an individual’s genetic risk factors
would then suddenly serve as con-
founding factors for the relationshiprvard School of Public Health, 677 Huntington Ave
erican Society of Human Genetics. All rights reserve
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mental exposures and disease where
none existed before. With personal
genetic knowledge, the genetic risk
factors for a particular disease (medi-
ated by an individual’s knowledge of
them) would themselves affect both
the likelihood of exposure to the envi-
ronmental risk factors and also the
likelihood of developing the disease.
This would arise even if there were
no biological or natural link between
the genetic factor and the environ-
mental factor to begin with; rather,
the confounding would arise through
an individual’s knowledge of their
own genetic risk and by an alteration
of behavior resulting from such
knowledge. A study that did not
control for such confounding by
genetic self knowledge could end up
with underestimates of the effect of
the environmental factor on the
disease, given that individuals with
the highest genetic risk may be those
that have intentionally taken action
to ensure the lowest possible level of
environmental exposure. If individ-
uals with a family history of disease
are also more likely to make use of
genetic testing, this would further
strengthen possible confounding.
Advances in our understanding of
the genetic basis of disease already
create some possibility of this occur-
ring in the near future. For example,
it was recently noted that by making
use of 12 recently discovered variants
associated with the risk of myocardial
infarction (MI) it is now possible to
identify 10% of populations ofnue, Boston, MA 02115, USA
d.
European descent who have a 1.63
elevated risk of MI on account of their
genetic profiles.6 If this knowledge is
generally available to the individuals
with elevated risk, this may result in
a change of health behaviors concern-
ing diet, smoking, and exercise. Like-
wise, individuals with low genetic
risk of MI may end up making less
strenuous efforts at altering environ-
mental and behavioral MI risk factors.
The genetic factors for MI, or at least
an individual’s knowledge of them,
then become confounding factors for
the relationship between environ-
mental exposures (e.g., diet, smoking,
exercise) and MI. A study that did not
control for these genetic factors (or for
‘‘genetic self knowledge’’) and exam-
ined the associations between envi-
ronmental factors and MI could end
up with biased estimates. For
example, a risk ratio for MI of 1.3
comparing different diets could be
completely eliminated by confound-
ing from a genetic variant that
increased MI risk by a factor of 1.6
and differed in prevalence by 60%
between the groups with different
diets; an actual risk ratio of 1.5 could
be reduced by such confounding to
approximately 1.1.14
Although the scope of this problem
is likely to be small at present, its rele-
vance may increase considerably with
time as our knowledge of the genetic
risk for common diseases advances
and as personal genetic information
becomes more widely available.
Proposals have been made concerning
the possibility of eventually using indi-
vidually tailored lifelong programs of
risk reduction as a future public health
effort.6 If this were to occur, the con-
founding structures introduced by
such highly tailored lifelong programs,
based on a potentially long list of
genetic risk factors, could become
quite complicated. Of course, it
remains yet to be seen the extent to
which genetic information will be of
use in risk prediction and the extent
to which behaviormay change in light
of knowledge of genetic risk.
One of the interesting features of
the changes that are likely to take
place in the knowledge that individ-uals have of their own genome is
that the implications of this knowl-
edge are relevant not simply for
genetics research but also for more
traditional epidemiologic analysis of
environmental factors. Even if
a chronic-disease epidemiologist is
interested only in the effects of envi-
ronmental exposures, genetic factors
will come to serve as confounders in
the study of such environmental
factors. It may thus eventually
become necessary to collect data on
genetic risk factors even in studies in
which the interest lies solely in assess-
ing the effects of an environmental
exposure, a point to which we will re-
turn below.
If personal genetic knowledge does
begin to change behavioral and envi-
ronmental exposures in this way,
then the overall ‘‘effect’’ of genetic
factors on various diseases is also
likely to change. Genetic association
studies conducted after such personal
genetic knowledge is being used will
capture not only the ‘‘biological’’
effects of various genetic risk factors,
as is the case at present, but also the
effects that these risk factors have on
decisions about modifying environ-
mental exposures to protect individ-
uals from disease. Because these two
effects will likely operate in opposite
directions, associations between
genetic variants and disease may end
up being attenuated in future studies
as individuals make use of genetic
knowledge to make behavioral and
lifestyle changes. Some of the signifi-
cant findings may disappear even if
the actual biology remains
unchanged, and an awareness of this
possibility will be important in not
discarding in the future significant
associations found before personal
genetic knowledge becomes more
widespread.
On the other hand, a recent web-
based study using data from 23andMe
makes clear that genetic self knowl-
edge can also generate bias in the
other direction when individuals self
report their phenotype.13 If pheno-
type is self reported, then individuals
who know their genetic predictions
for a particular trait may be moreThe American Journal of Human Glikely to self report the trait for which
they are genetically predisposed. In
analyses that consider sprinter versus
long-distance runner as the pheno-
type, Eriksson et al.13 found that
responses differed considerably (p <
1063) between individuals who had
or had not seen their genotypes,
demonstrating that the degree of this
form of ascertainment bias can be
quite substantial.
Personal genetic knowledge has
implications not only for introduc-
tion of confounding in epidemiologic
research, for effect attenuation in
genetic association studies, and for
ascertainment bias for self-reported
outcomes, but also for what study
designs and analytic techniques may
be appropriate. The case-only study
design15 has allowed for the analysis
of gene-environment interaction in
settings in which information is avail-
able only about the ‘‘cases’’ (i.e.,
diseased subjects), and this study
design has also allowed for more
powerful tests for interaction in
a number of settings.16 The study
design, however, relies on an assump-
tion of independence between the
genetic and environmental factors.
In some contexts this may be, though
is not always,15,17 a reasonable
assumption. However, even if genetic
and environmental factors are pres-
ently independent, if in the future
personal genetic knowledge is used
to make changes to an individual’s
environmental exposure, the assump-
tion of independence will no longer
be preserved. In samples in which
genetic self knowledge is being used
to change environmental exposure,
the case-only design will no longer
constitute a valid design (though if
the genetic and environmental factors
are negatively correlated, the case-
only design may still yield conserva-
tive estimates of gene-environment
interaction parameters18,19).
Likewise, certain family-based
designs also rely on an assumption
of independence of genetic and envi-
ronmental factors,20 and these too
will be rendered inapplicable if
personal genetic knowledge intro-
duces correlation. Similarly, certainenetics 87, 168–172, August 13, 2010 169
statistical techniques used in the anal-
ysis of gene-environment interaction
have also relied on an assumption of
independence of genetic and environ-
mental factors,21–23 and these will
likewise be rendered invalid if individ-
uals use genetic self knowledge to alter
their environmental exposures so that
genetic and environmental factors
become correlated. The implications
of personal genetic knowledge thus
not only simply concern the possi-
bility of new sources of confounding
and ascertainment bias but also
extend to the validity of study designs
and analytic techniques.
Preparing for Personal Genetics in
Epidemiologic Research
Because of limited access to individual
genomic information and our still
very incomplete understanding of
the genetic risk factors for common
diseases, the problem of confounding
from genetic self knowledge is prob-
ably of more relevance to the future
than to the present. It will be helpful,
however, to prepare for what may well
become an increasingly widespread
issue.
If confounding from such genetic
self knowledge is present, it will in
many instances be necessary to collect
data on and control for the genetic
confounding factors or to at least
collect data on the knowledge that
individuals have of this genetic infor-
mation. Although, at present, genetic
confounding, if operative, could jeop-
ardize or render infeasible a great deal
of current epidemiologic research
because of the cost of genotyping
entire study samples, this issue of
prohibitive cost may become increas-
ingly less problematic. The cost of
genotyping has fallen considerably
since the technology was first intro-
duced, and the trend of declining
costs is likely to continue. The possi-
bility of obtaining genomic informa-
tion in all epidemiologic studies, not
for the purposes of assessing genetic
association, but for the purposes of
confounding control, may with time
not be infeasible.
It should be noted that the possi-
bility of genetic factors serving as170 The American Journal of Human Geneticsconfounders for the relationship
between environmental exposures
and various diseases can arise without
personal knowledge of individual
genetic variants. First, even without
information on specific genetic vari-
ants, individuals often have knowl-
edge of family history that may simi-
larly alter behavior. However, for rare
outcomes, the extent of the con-
founding bias that this generates
may be small, and moreover, at least
at present, it is easier and cheaper to
control for family history than for
specific genetic variants. Second,
such genetic confounding can also
occur if correlated genetic variants or
the same genetic variant is a risk factor
for both the exposure and the disease.
For example, some recent findings
indicate that certain genetic variants
may be a common cause of both
smoking behavior through nicotine
dependence and lung cancer.24–28 If
this is indeed the case, this would
bias effect estimates for smoking if
not controlled for, although this bias
would likely not be of sufficient
magnitude to change qualitative
conclusions.29
The smoking and lung cancer
example suggests another way to
move forward with rigorous research
in the epidemiologic analysis of envi-
ronmental and behavioral factors
even if data is not available on poten-
tial genetic confounding. The possi-
bility of an unobserved genetic factor
affecting both smoking and lung
cancer was proposed fairly early by
Fisher.30 Cornfield and colleagues29
used associations between smoking
and lung cancer from observational
data to consider the likelihood that
this association could have come
about simply because of a common
genetic cause of both smoking and
lung cancer; they developed a sensi-
tivity-analysis technique to show
that confounding by a genetic factor
was unlikely to completely account
for the association. More generally,
if, in an era of personal genetics, infor-
mation is available on the extent to
which genetic self knowledge affects
behavioral and environmental expo-
sures and the extent to which specific87, 168–172, August 13, 2010genetic factors increase the risk of
specific diseases, it may then be
possible to use sensitivity-analysis
techniques14,29,31–34 to assess the like-
lihood that associations arising from
observational data might be due to
or altered by genetic confounding.
A simple rule of thumb can be
useful in this regard. Suppose we are
interested in the association between
an exposure and an outcome and
have not adjusted for a dichotomous
covariate U indicating the presence
or absence of risk-elevating alleles.
Let g denote the risk ratio for the
outcome comparing U ¼ 1 and U ¼
0 conditional on the exposure and
measured covariates, and let p1 and
p0 denote the prevalence of U among
the exposed and unexposed subjects,
respectively. The ratio between the
estimate for the effect of the exposure
on the outcome obtained from the
data and that which would have
been obtained had adjustment been
made for the unmeasured variable U
is given by:32–34
1þ ðg 1Þp1
1þ ðg 1Þp0
Thus, in the MI example in the
previous section, if we had g ¼ 1.6,
p1 ¼ 0.2, and p0 ¼ 0.8 (so that p1 
p0 ¼ 0.6), the formula above would
give 0.76, indicating that an actual
risk ratio of 1.3 would be reduced by
genetic confounding to 1.3 3 0.76 z
1. The formula above also holds for
odds ratio when the outcome is rare.
It gives only a simple rule of thumb
and holds only under simplifying
assumptions. Other, more sophisti-
cated sensitivity-analysis techniques
are also available in the literature.32–34
Another possible approach to
address confounding in epidemio-
logic research in an era of genetic self
knowledge is to restrict studies to pop-
ulations in which genetic knowledge
is not being utilized. Advances in
genetic research and access to indi-
vidual genomic information are likely
to propagate to different segments of
the population at different rates.
Communities that, for social or reli-
gious reasons, are committed to not
making use of such information may
be particularly valuable in conducting
epidemiologic research without
requiring the collection of genomic
information, though questions of
generalizability will then also be
important to consider. Even aside
from isolated populations, genetic
testing raises issues of generalizability:
if individuals who use genetic tests are
also more likely to participate in
studies, generalizability of study find-
ings will be partially compromised.
Another strategy to circumvent
possible genetic confounding would
be to continue to use existing and
maturing cohorts and studies con-
ducted before genetic self knowledge
is widespread. Such prior studies may
prove valuable in the future but will
also raise questions of generalizability
as time passes and as sociodemo-
graphic distributions change.
It should finally be noted that
although genetic knowledge may alter
what is required in the conduct of
observational research in epidemi-
ology, such genetic knowledge will
generally not raise similar issues in
the study of drug efficacy in which
the study design itself randomizes the
administration of treatment so that it
is, at least in large samples on average,
independent of genetic factors and
personal genetic knowledge. Indeed,
such randomized trials may be able to
utilize our expanding genetic knowl-
edge so as to effectively evaluate
specific treatments or regimes tailored
to individual genetic information.5,35
Concluding Remarks
As we have seen, the possibility that
individuals will use genetic self knowl-
edge to make decisions about behav-
ioral and environmental exposures
may introduce new genetic sources of
confounding in studies of environ-
mental exposures where none was
previously present. Studies of environ-
mental factors that do not control for
genetic self knowledge may produce
effect estimates biased downwards.
Future association studies of genetic
variants may find considerably attenu-
ated effects after personal genetic
knowledge becomesmore widely avail-
able. Ascertainment bias may bepresent when individuals self report
phenotype. Likewise, validity issues
may arise with regard to study designs
and analytic techniques that require
a gene-environment independence
assumption that may be violated by
individuals’ use of genetic knowledge
to make decisions about environ-
mental exposures. As genetics research
advances, this phenomenon may
become increasingly widespread. It is
thus not only the case that our genetic
knowledge will potentially revolu-
tionize personalized medicine but
that personalized genetic medicine
may itself significantly alter what is
necessary in the practice of research,
and it will be important to be prepared
for the changes that may come.Acknowledgments
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